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Launches involving radioisotope power systems 
(RPS) or radioisotope heater units (RHU’s) must comply 
with a number of different statutory, regulatory, and 
administrative requirements. While some of these are well 
defined, others have been carried out on the basis of past 
practice rather than a set of formal standards. In 
addition, some of the requirements reference outdated 
standards and are in need of updates. The overall process 
is also time consuming and expensive. This paper 
describes efforts by NASA, the Department of Energy 
(DOE) and others to make improvements to the process 
while maintaining safety and environmental protection. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Radioisotope Power Systems (RPS) support missions that 
need autonomous, long-duration power.  RPS have a 
proven record of operation in the most extreme cold, 
dusty, dark, and high-radiation environments, both in 
space and on planetary surfaces.  
RPS technologies offer potential to serve a wide range of 
missions.  The NASA RPS Program has an established 
relationship with the DOE and current agreements and 
processes are in place to support mission requirements. 
Safety is an integral part of any nuclear system, and it 
encompasses the entire system lifecycle.  
The strategy used to meet safety objectives for any U.S. 
space nuclear heat source or system is to: 
Design and build safety into each nuclear heat source and 
system at the outset, considering its potential applications;  
Demonstrate the safety of each nuclear heat source and 
system through rigorous analysis and testing; and  
Separately and quantitatively assess the environmental 
impact as well as the level of risk for each proposed 
nuclear system and nuclear-powered space mission for 
use in decision making and approval processes. 
II. REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 
The goal of the nuclear launch approval process is to 
understand the risks (environment and public) associated 
with the launch of radioactive materials.  The current 
process evolved from existing federal requirements, 
which include: 
II.A. Presidential Directive/National Security Council 
– 25 (PD/NSC-25) 
Entitled “Scientific or Technological Experiments with 
Possible Large-Scale Adverse Environmental Effects and 
Launch of Nuclear Systems into Space,” this directive 
was first issued in 1977 under President Jimmy Carter. 
The directive addresses a range of actions that could have 
international impacts. One paragraph specifically 
addresses launches involving nuclear material. It specifies 
that certain launches require Presidential approval, and 
requires an Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel 
(INSRP) (including DOD, DOE, NASA, EPA and the 
NRC) to evaluate the risks associated with missions 
requiring the President’s approval. 
II.B. 2010 National Space Policy 
The National Space Policy has been updated a number of 
times. The 2010 version largely deals with the issues 
associated with commercial space. It has a short section 
addressing nuclear launches and requires 
Presidential/designee approval for nuclear-powered 
spacecraft launches; and directs DOE to conduct a nuclear 
a nuclear safety analysis and produce a safety analysis to 
be evaluated by the ad hoc INSRP. 
II.C. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
NEPA requires federal agencies to analyze potential 
environmental impacts during program and project 
decision making. It specifically requires an environmental 
impact statement (EIS) for “major federal actions 
significantly impacting the quality of the human 
environment.”1 The Council on Environmental Quality 
(CEQ) has regulations which expand upon the 
requirements in the statute and provide guidance on its 
implementation. NASA also has issued regulations (14 
CFR 1216) for its implementation of NEPA. 
II.D. National Response Plan (NRP) 
The NRP provides the mechanisms for a comprehensive 
coordinated response to all Incidents of National 
Significance. Incidents of National Significance are high-
impact events that require an extensive and well-
coordinated multiagency response to save lives, minimize 
damage, and provide the basis for long-term community 
and economic recovery. As the principal Federal official 
for domestic incident management, the Secretary of 
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Homeland Security declares Incidents of National 
Significance (in consultation with other departments and 
agencies as appropriate). 
In order to prepare the response in the event of an 
accident associated with a nuclear launch, a radiological 
contingency plan (RCP) team is established and includes 
all appropriate federal, state and local agencies that may 
be involved in the response. 
II.E. NASA Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8715.3 
“General Safety Program Requirements”, Chapter 6 
“Nuclear Safety for Launching Radioactive Materials” 
NASA’s Nuclear Launch Safety Approval (NLSA) 
process is captured in NPR 8715.3 “General Safety 
Program Requirements”, Chapter 6 “Nuclear Safety for 
Launching Radioactive Materials.” The NPR includes 
NASA procedural requirements for implementation of 
PD/NSC-25, and is managed by Office of Safety and 
Mission Assurance (OSMA). It includes requirements to 
designate a Nuclear Flight Safety Assurance Manager 
(NFSAM) and an INSRP Coordinator, and calls for the 
OSMA to provide assistance to the cognizant NASA 
Mission Directorate and project office(s) in meeting 
nuclear launch safety analysis/evaluation requirements 
and review all radiological contingency and emergency 
planning. 
III. PROGRESS ON IMPROVEMENTS 
III.A. PD/NSC-25 
The PD/NSC-25 was last amended in 1996. It requires 
Presidential approval for launches of reactors and other 
devices with a potential for criticality and for radioactive 
sources containing total quantities greater than 1,000 
times the A2 value listed in Table I of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Safety Series 6, 
Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive 
Materials, 1985 Edition (as amended 1990). 
In June 2018, the National Science and Technology 
Council (NSTC) Subcommittee on Space Hazards and 
Security formed a Nuclear Safety Launch Process (NSLP) 
Working Group (hereafter, “the WG”). The WG was 
tasked with reviewing the existing launch approval 
process and considering potential policy and process 
adjustments, possibly including revisions to PD/NSC-25.  
Areas that the work group felt needed to be addressed 
included: 
- Trigger levels – i.e. the establishment of a revised 
threshold for triggering the launch approval process. 
- Bounding – i.e. an acceptable risk or exposure level that 
is determined to be sufficiently safe for launch approval, 
and  
- Processes, i.e. the establishment of standards and 
procedures to guide the INSRP in the conduct of their 
reviews. For example, a charter or terms of reference 
could be developed for the INSRP to outline what is and 
is not expected from the review.  
III.B. NEPA 
NASA’s regulations implementing NEPA list types of 
actions that “normally require an EIS,” including 
“Development and operation of a space flight 
project/program which would launch and operate a 
nuclear reactor or radioisotope power systems and devices 
using a total quantity of radioactive material greater than 
… a total quantity of radioactive material for which the 
A2 Mission Multiple (see definitions in Appendix A to 
this subpart) is greater than 10)).”2 
NASA has begun discussions with the Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ), the executive agency 
which oversees NEPA implementation across the federal 
government. The initial indications are that CEQ is 
supportive of making NASA’s NEPA regulations less 
proscriptive and more flexible. 
NASA has also kicked off the development of a 
Programmatic Environmental Assessment (PEA) for 
missions that would use only RHU’s. The PEA would 
satisfy NASA’s obligations under NEPA for missions that 
fit within its parameters. The PEA would cover spacecraft 
launched from Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and Cape 
Canaveral Air Station (CCAFS), Florida. The U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. Air Force (USAF) 
and Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) are cooperating 
agencies on the PEA. The DOE’s cooperating agency role 
stems from its responsibility in producing and controlling 
the radioisotope material used in RHUs; DOE maintains 
the ownership of RHUs throughout their life cycle and 
allows for their use in NASA missions. The USAF is a 
cooperating agency because it manages the launch 
facilities at CCAFS and has expertise in launches using 
RHUs. The FAA is a cooperating agency because it issues 
launch operator licenses and experimental permits for 
commercial spacecraft activities at KSC. 
A key question in the development of the PEA is how 
many RHU’s should be considered to be within its scope. 
The current direction is now basing the upper limit of 
RHUs on the projected need as determined by NASA; we 
will then perform the impact analysis on alternatives 
developed based on the potential need and disclose the 
risk through the NEPA process. This process follows a 
traditional NEPA approach of agencies determining their 
proposed action based on their needs and then 
determining the environmental effect of that need. The 
current alternatives being considered are as follows: 
Alternative A) Up to 65 RHUs (or the Curie equivalent) 
Alternative B) up to 130 RHUs (or the Curie equivalent). 
The PEA is scheduled to be completed by mid-2019. 
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III.C. NATIONAL SPACE POLICY 
The National Space Policy states that the Secretary of 
Energy “shall conduct a nuclear safety analysis” for 
launches that require Presidential approval. However, it 
does not say how that analysis should be conducted.  
DOE management has reviewed the process for producing 
SAR;s for past missions and has found that: 
• Excellent engineering provides significant 
mitigation of Pu release  
• No formal regulations to establish requirements 
and acceptable level of risk acceptance (exempt 
from 10 CFR 830) 
• The space nuclear safety analysis methodology 
differs from other current DOE approaches 
• The process has remained relatively unchanged 
for several decades 
• There was a lack of prioritization and binning to 
assess risk importance, as it was easier to accept 
and make changes versus analyzing the technical 
merits of risk impacts resulting from these 
changes 
DOE has considered several options for nuclear launches 
subsequent to Mars 2020. One option is to prepare a 
documented safety analysis (DSA), centered around the 
RPS or RHU’s, using DOE published standards as 
guidelines or references. Once such a DSA is in place, it 
can be used to bound the conditions for launch in a 
technology and mission independent fashion. For 
example, the DSA could show that the RPS or RHU has a 
very low probability of releasing plutonium-238 under a 
given set of pressures, temperatures, and shock limits. If 
future missions do not result in conditions that exceed 
these established limits, then further analysis of the 
accident scenario, or any modification to the DSA, would 
be unnecessary.  
A DSA for RHU-only missions has now been kicked off 
by DOE. When completed, it would function as described 
above and could significantly streamline the launch 
approval process for missions within its scope. 
Assumptions made for this DSA include: 
- A single generic launch vehicle / spacecraft 
configuration will be defined to provide 
bounding values for fuel, etc. 
- The hazard analysis will consider accidents 
associated only with the launch phase(s) that 
contributed the majority of risk per the MSL and 
Mars 2020 FSARs (e.g., pre-launch, early 
launch) 
- A bounding nuclear payload consisting of 
LWRHUs will be established 
- Acceptance criteria (e.g., health effects) other 
than current DOE Evaluation Guidelines may be 
needed for evaluation and risk binning of 
potential hazardous events 
- Environmental effects of potential radioactive 
material releases will be adequately addressed in 
pertinent NEPA documentation (i.e., the safety 
analysis methodology does not address 
environmental impacts) 
- DSA may be used to support integration of 
safety into mission and launch decisions  
III.C. FISSION SYSTEMS 
In addition to RPS, efforts are also underway to improve 
the nuclear launch approval process for potential fission 
systems. Fission systems have been a consideration in the 
OSTP’s work on the process, and NASA has 
commissioned a work group to make policy and technical 
recommendations in this regard. These efforts are 
described in a separate paper. 
IV. GOING FORWARD 
A number of potential improvements and new ways of 
doing business have been identified above. Obviously, 
these will involve a number of different organizations to 
carry them out. Those organizations include: 
• NASA’s: 
o Science Mission Directorate Mission 
Program Offices 
o Launch Services Program Office  
o Office of Safety and Mission Assurance 
(OSMA) 
o Environmental Management Division 
(EMD) 
• Department of Energy 
• US Air Force Space Command 
• Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
• And others 
In order to ensure coordination of all these parties, the 
NASA Radioisotope Power Systems Program Office has 
established the function of Nuclear Launch Approval 
Manager (NLAM). The NLAM will conduct both 
ongoing coordination of the interested parties, and 
mission-specific coordination, acting as the agent for the 
mission Program Executive. A number of NASA 
handbooks and procedural requirements are being 
rewritten to recognize this function. 
The PEA and DSA mentioned above for RHU-only 
missions could eventually serve as templates for similar 
documents to be developed for future RPS generators.   
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
The nuclear launch approval process encompasses a 
number of complimentary safety and environmental 
reviews, building on an extensive technical basis of 
information regarding launch vehicles, spacecraft, and 
RPS/RHU’s. This technical basis is the key to 
maintaining safety and environmental protection. The 
“how” for the reviews should be updated to ensure they 
reference current standards, make use of past analysis, 
and are commensurate in scope to the risks being 
addressed. 
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